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THE  FRAMING  OF  FINANCIAL  DECISIONS:  A  PILOT  STUDY 
 
Abstract 
 
We continually need to make decisions, but it is clear that, in so doing, we do not act in 
accordance with strict rules of rationality.  For example, the effect of framing (i.e. the choice 
of particular words to present a given set of facts) can influence our choices, which raises 
some serious questions about our real freedom of choice. 
 
An increasing body of literature on framing supports a tendency for people to take more risks 
when seeking to avoid losses as opposed to securing gains.  This is explained by framing and 
the value function within Tversky & Kahneman’s prospect theory. 
 
An empirical study was undertaken within a Business School to test the hypothesis that 
framing influenced subjects’ choices in four simple financial decisions (A,B,C,D) as 
indicated in the previous paragraph. 
 
The results, based on a sample of 51 adults, partly supported the hypothesis (cases B and D), 
but the anticipated outcomes were not found in cases A and C.  It is probably a high level of 
risk aversion, irrespective of framing, on the part of the subjects which explains these 
unexpected findings since subjects exhibited a clear tendency to favour certainty over risky 
options. 
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Introduction 
 
Everyday life is full of dilemmas in which individuals (or groups) are faced with choices 
which require that decisions be made.  Psychological principles governing the perception of 
dilemmas ‘….produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in 
different ways’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  This raises some serious questions regarding 
theories of rational decision-making - given that many explanations and predictions of 
individual choice are based on assumptions of rational behaviour. 
 
Among the criteria by which rationality might be defined are consistency and coherence, but 
the evidence from research studies on framing shows that these criteria are frequently (and 
systematically) violated. 
 
In addition to criteria such as consistency and coherence, the notion of rational decision-
making is based on various assumptions about the factors which guide behaviour as well as 
the unit of analysis (e.g. whether it is the individual actor or an organisation). 
 
At a simple level, involving an individual decision-maker faced with the need to make a 
choice among competing solutions to a problem, the rational approach is for the decision-
maker to specify his/her objective function (e.g. maximisation of utility) and then to assess 
the alternative choices in order to identify the one which best meets the objective. 
 
The traditionally rational  approach espoused by economists sees the individual as trying to 
do the best thing for himself/herself and being aware of all the available options.  In other 
words, the approach reflects a means-ends analysis: so long as the most appropriate means 
(i.e. choice) are chosen for specified ends (i.e. objective), then the decision is rational.  This 
is, of course, a normative model of how decisions ought to be made (from an economics 
perspective) rather than an empirically-grounded model of how decisions are actually made.  
Not only does it deal with a world of certainties, there are also human frailties which render it 
of limited value. 
 
In their 1981 paper (as in the programme of work behind many of their publications) Tversky 
& Kahneman sought to contrast real people’s actual behaviour with the norms of rational 
economic behaviour.  However, this was not the first such assault on economic orthodoxy: 
the late Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality (which was at the heart of his 
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University of Chicago PhD dissertation almost 60 years ago, and which was the basis for his 
being awarded a Nobel Prize in 1978) was an earlier attack.  Simon (e.g. 1959) observed that, 
as individuals, we possess limited cognitive capabilities for knowing what is best, or for 
identifying the full array of alternative choices, or for processing information, hence the 
notion of economic rationality in decision-making is empirically untenable.  (See also 
Brunsson 1985, Sutherland 1992, and McCrone 1993.) 
 
Reference has already been made en passant to the phenomenon of framing (i.e. the 
particular choice of words used to present a given set of facts).  Framing a choice situation in 
different ways can lead to different patterns of response from subjects.  In other words, the 
way in which the alternatives are framed has a substantial impact on people’s judgements.  
Studies by, inter alia, Tversky & Kahneman (1981), McNeil et al. (1982), and Meyerowitz & 
Chaiken (1987) support this view, and it raises questions which are non-trivial in considering 
the extent to which our decision-making processes are consistent and transparent.  For 
example, how much insight and awareness do we have regarding our own thinking when 
engaged in decision-making?  Subjects are much more likely to identify factors other than 
framing to justify their choices, which makes one wonder how much freedom of choice 
people have if they are susceptible to manipulation via framing.  (The public reaction to 
sustained ‘spinning’ by the Blair Government suggests, of course, that manipulative 
approaches to framing of this type will not fool all of the people all of the time!) 
 
Sutherland (1992, Chapter 16) reviewed the framing literature and noted the tendency for 
people to take more risks to avoid losses than to make gains whilst observing that '‘...it cannot 
be rational to make different decisions on the same problem depending on how it is 
posed'’(pp.223-4).  He conjectured that, whilst some satisfaction will be obtained by making 
a certain gain, the additional satisfaction which might accrue by making a larger but uncertain 
gain may not be sufficient to compensate for the sense of disappointment in making no gain 
at all if the gamble does not come off. 
 
This raises the likelihood of the actor regretting his/her choice.  ‘In the case of losses, if 
[he/she opts] for taking a certain loss, that in itself will cause dismay: hence [the actor] may 
think it worth risking a larger loss with the compensating chance of avoiding any loss at all 
and therefore avoiding any dismay’ (Sutherland, 1992: 224). 
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An appropriate decision rule in the light of ‘regret’ is to seek to minimise the maximum 
possible regret given that, having made a choice that does not turn out to be the best one, the 
decision-maker will regret not having chosen another course of action when he/she had the 
opportunity.  (See Wilson, 1974: 262-3.) 
 
Baron & Byrne (1987: 352-3) discuss framing in the context of social bargaining, noting that 
individuals tend to focus either on potential losses or on potential gains, and this exerts 
powerful effects on the strategies they adopt in social exchange, and on the outcomes they 
achieve.  For example, when the focus is primarily on losses which might be experienced (i.e. 
a negative frame is adopted), bargainers are prone to digging in their heels and resisting 
making any concessions.  On the other hand, when the focus is primarily on gains which 
might be achieved (i.e. a positive frame is adopted), bargainers demonstrate greater flexibility 
and are likely to be more successful in securing agreement. 
 
In the light of studies by Bazerman and his colleagues (e.g. Neale & Bazerman, 1985), there 
appears to be strong support for the benefits of positive framing.  Subjects who adopt this 
perspective are likely to make larger concessions, resolve more difficulties, and achieve more 
favourable settlements than those adopting a negative frame.  Indeed, the frame which is 
adopted can be more important in achieving a negotiated settlement than the more objective 
factors (such as costs and benefits) involved. 
 
Another context in which framing is conspicuous is that of entrapment.  (See Wilson & 
Zhang, 1997.)  This occurs when a responsible individual increases his/her commitment to an 
ineffective course of action in order to justify the previous allocation of resources to that task.  
 
Whilst entrapment is not easily explained in terms of economic rationality, there are various 
plausible explanations reflecting psychological rationality.  For example (see Wilson & 
Gilligan, 1997: 728-730): 
 
• there is a need for the decision-maker to assert himself/herself and reaffirm the wisdom of 
his/her initial decision; 
• the initial commitment was made as a result of the decision-maker’s belief in the 
goodness of the course of action, hence self-justification, justification to others, and the 
norms of consistency are served by continuing; 
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• continuing avoids the waste of the investment already made (which is known as the sunk 
cost fallacy); 
• further investment gives further opportunities for things to come good; 
• negative feedback is treated as a learning experience (i.e. a cue to revise the inputs rather 
than cancel the project); 
• negative feedback, alternatively, maybe seen as a chance variation; 
• a state of inertia has been created by which a project’s financial past cannot be divorced 
from its future - prior investment then motivates the decision to continue; 
• decisions are not made in a social vacuum, hence social costs and benefits much be 
considered relating to self-image, organisational image, reputation and face-saving - 
continue so long as the social and psychological benefits are greater than the economic 
costs; 
• information processing has behavioural underpinnings, such as selective perception; 
• an organisation’s reward system may work to encourage the decision-maker to overlook 
short-term setbacks and continue with the project through bad times. 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) has been used to explain the phenomenon of 
entrapment, and it helps in showing why people typically undervalue potential gains and over 
value potential losses.  Figure 1 portrays a value function which shows the relationship 
between objectively-defined gains and losses, and the subjective value placed on these by the 
decision-maker. 
 
      Value 
          + 
 
 
 
 
 
  Losses    A    Gains 
      £            £ 
 
 
 
       B 
 
          - 
      Value 
 
Figure 1 : The Value Function
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At the outset the decision-maker is at point A, but if the decision has an unsuccessful 
outcome he/she will move to point B where further losses do not result in large decreases in 
value.  On the other hand, any gains will result in large increases in value, thus, at point B, 
the decision-maker will risk further losses in the hope of making gains.  Despite the sunk 
costs, risky behaviour is much more likely at point B than it was at point A. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the primary focus of this paper is on the preference for 
avoiding losses as opposed to securing gains, and the way in which different ways of framing 
what is essentially the same situations might result in preference reversals. 
 
Four dilemmas were used, each dealing with a different financial decision.  The same 
hypothesis was applicable to each dilemma (or situation requiring a decision).  In its null 
form this was: 
 
 Ho The population distribution of choices in Situation X is independent of the 
framing of the dilemma. 
 
The alternative form was: 
 
 H1 The population distribution of choices in Situation X is not independent of the 
framing of the dilemma. 
 
All four dilemmas were framed in two different ways to provide a positive and negative 
framing for each: the wording can be seen in Appendix 1 (relating to Version 1 of the 
instrument employed) and in Appendix 2 (relating to Version 2 of the instrument employed).   
 
The four dilemmas were: 
 
• Situation A which is essentially the same as Dilemma 4 from Tversky & Kahneman 
(1981) to facilitate some cautious comparison with that study. 
• Situation B which is based on an example from Thaler (1980). 
• Situation C  } 
which were specially devised for this study. • Situation D  } 
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In summary: 
 
 
Situation A 
 
 Version 1 Positive 
 Version 2 Negative 
but essentially the same outcomes apply to each choice within V1 and V2. 
 
Situation B 
 
 Version 1 Negative 
 Version 2 Positive 
but essentially the same alternatives were presented in V1 and V2. 
 
Situation C 
 
 Version 1 Negative 
 Version 2 Positive 
but essentially the same scenario was behind both V1 and V2. 
 
Situation D 
 
 Version 1 Positive 
 Version 2 Negative 
but essentially the same risk profile was presented in both V1 and V2. 
 
In each case the hypothesis was subject to a one-tailed test (using χ2) since it was anticipated 
that subjects would exhibit a greater concern to avoid potential losses than to secure potential 
gains.  Woodside & Stringer (1994) have suggested that the effects of framing may be 
overridden by social interactions, but all four dilemmas used in this study deliberately 
excluded any social interactions, hence subjects might be expected to rely on some inherent 
sense of rationality in arriving at their choices. 
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Method 
 
(a) Subjects 
 
 The subjects were the researcher’s colleagues (i.e. the entire population covering 
academic staff, support staff and full-time research students) in the Business School in 
which he is employed.  Details are given below by gender and category for the 
population, and with the addition of ages for those who responded.  (Ages are not 
known for the population - at least not by the researcher.) 
 
POPULATION 
 
Category Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
46
8
23
 15
37
11
 61
45
34
 
TOTAL 77  63  140  
 
RESPONDENTS (NUMBERS AND RATES)* 
 
Category  Male  Female  Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
21
2
8
46%
25%
35%
5
13
2
33% 
35% 
18% 
26 
15 
10 
43%
33%
29%
TOTAL 31 40% 20 32% 51 36%
 
*Response rates were reported in the previous section - after eliminating four 
instruments (one V1, three V2) which had missing data. 
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MEAN AGES OF RESPONDENTS (YEARS) 
 
Category Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
47.6
46.0
30.0
 45.2
42.3
32.0
 47.1
42.8
30.5
 
TOTAL 43.0  42.0  42.6  
 
 Chi-square tests show that differences in response rates are random variations: 
 
• Categories 
• Gender 
χ2 = 1.920 
χ2 = 1.085 
2df 
1df 
p = 0.383 
p = 0.298 
 
Details relating to each version of the questionnaire (V1 and V2) are given below: 
 
 VERSION 1 
 Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
12 
1 
3 
2 
5 
1 
14 
6 
4 
TOTAL RESPONDENTS 16 8 24 
 
 Mean Ages (Years) 
 Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
49.2 
71 
34 
46.5 
45 
33 
48.8 
49.3 
33.8 
TOTAL (Years) 47.7 43.9 46.4 
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 VERSION 2 
 Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
9 
1 
5 
3 
8 
1 
12 
9 
6 
TOTAL RESPONDENTS 15 12 27 
 
 Mean Ages (Years) 
 Male Female Total 
Academic staff 
Support staff 
Research students 
45.4 
21 
27.8 
44.3 
40.6 
31 
45.2 
38.4 
28.3 
TOTAL (Years) 37.9 40.8 39.2 
 
 The characteristics of respondents are similar for both V1 and V2: there is no reason 
to think that the responses are influenced by differences in the characteristics of 
respondents. 
 
(b) Materials 
 
 Both versions of the instrument used, including the covering letters, are shown as 
Appendix 1 (V1) and Appendix 2 (V2). 
 
 The origin of the dilemmas and the logic behind their inclusion have already been 
discussed. 
 
(c) Procedures 
 
 The instruments, along with covering letters, were distributed to all subjects in the 
population via their mail trays.  A coin was tossed to see whether the first subject (in 
alphabetic sequence) should be given V1 or V2, and every alternate subject received 
the same version, with other subjects receiving the alternative version. 
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 Subjects were requested to return their completed forms by a specified date which 
allowed ten days for their completion in circumstances which were unsupervised and 
not subject to any arbitrary time limits. 
 
 By distributing the instruments to all, and due to the anonymity of the process, there 
was no pressure on anyone to participate, nor were there any attempts made to chase 
up subjects who had not responded by the specified date since it was not known who 
had and who had not responded.  The entire process was voluntary. 
 
Results 
 
Whilst Takemura (1992, 1993) has shown that the effects of framing are likely to be lower 
when subjects are warned in advance that they will be required to justify their choices, and 
when more time is allowed for arriving at their choices, there was no requirement in this 
project for subjects to state any justification for their choices, and (as noted earlier) there was 
no control over the time taken in reaching choices. 
 
The summarised data is given below: 
 
VERSION 1 
 
(N = 24) SITUATION A SITUATION B 
 X Y E F 
 22 2 24 - 
 
 SITUATION C SITUATION D 
 Y N Y N 
 6 18 10 14 
 
VERSION 2 
 
(N = 27) SITUATION A SITUATION B 
 X Y E F 
 20 7 3 24 
 
 SITUATION C SITUATION D 
 Y N Y N 
 8 19 1 26 
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Chi-squared results for each situation are given below: 
 
Situation A 
 χ2  =  2.71 
 CV0.05  = 3.84 
 CV0.01  = 6.64 
 
 2.71 < 3.84 < 6.64 
 ∴ Unable to reject Ho 
 
Situation B 
 χ2  =  40.27 
 CV0.05  = 3.84 
 CV0.01  = 6.64 
 
 3.84 < 6.64 < 40.27 
 ∴ Reject Ho at .005 level 
 
Situation C 
 χ2  =  0.14 
 CV0.05  = 3.84 
 CV0.01  = 6.64 
 
 0.14 < 3.84 < 6.64 
 ∴ Unable to reject Ho 
 
Situation D 
 χ2  =  10.81 
 CV0.05  = 3.84 
 CV0.01  = 6.64 
 
 3.84 < 6.64 < 10.81 
 ∴ Reject Ho at .005 level 
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The conditions that need to be fulfilled when using χ2 are: 
 
(i) the data must be categorical; 
(ii) the data must be based on counts; 
(iii) sample data must be presented in a contingency table; 
(iv) one-tailed tests can be carried out only in 2 x 2 contingency tables; 
(v) expected values below five should be treated with caution. 
 
All these conditions were met with the exception of (v) in the case of Situation A where there 
were two expected values slightly below five, hence the results for Situation A need to be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
Discussion 
 
Choices involving prospective gains are often risk averse whilst choices involving 
prospective losses are often risk accepting, even when the dilemmas are essentially identical 
apart from their framing. 
 
Inconsistent responses were found by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) who explained this 
phenomenon in terms of the conjunction of a framing effect with contradictory attitudes 
towards risks involving gains and losses - as portrayed in their prospect theory (outlined 
earlier).  At the heart of this theory is the proposition that the displeasure associated with 
losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning the 
same amount.  This is captured by the value function (see Figure 1) in which the curve above 
the origin is convex whereas below the origin it is concave. 
 
With regard to Situation A, the results show (as did those of Tversky & Kahneman - see 
below) that the majority choice in V1 reflects risk aversion (i.e. a riskless prospect is 
preferred to a risky prospect of equal or greater expected value).   
 
In contrast, Tversky & Kahneman found that the majority of their V2 subjects chose a risky 
option, thereby supporting the preference reversal argument that a risky loss prospect is 
preferable to a riskless prospect of equal expected value. 
 
 15
 Situation A: Comparison of Results 
 
 T & K (1981) Wilson (2001) 
V1 X 
 Y 
V2 X 
 Y 
84% 
16% 
13% 
87% 
92% 
8% 
74% 
26% 
 N = 150+ N = 51 
 
However, the results from the V2 subjects in the present study show a very similar pattern to 
the V1 results, and there is no statistically significant difference which suggests that the 
choices were independent of the framing of the dilemma.  But these results - despite being the 
opposite of that which was expected - do conform with the pseudo certainty effect by which 
subjects prefer options framed in terms of certainty. 
 
Tversky & Kahneman’s subjects were students at one US University and one Canadian 
University who answered brief questionnaires in a classroom setting.  The sample size was 
greater than that in the present study, the subjects differed, the context in which the 
questionnaire was completed was different, other cultural characteristics were different, and 
there was a time gap of 20 years, so these factors may account for some aspects of the 
findings.  It is also necessary to repeat the earlier note of caution over some small expected 
values. 
 
Turning to Situation B, it is relevant that Thaler (1980) gave an example (in a riskless context 
such as that of Situation B) of the value function effect based on the shape of the curve: it is 
steeper for losses than for gains, hence any difference between two options will loom larger 
when it is framed as a disadvantage of one option rather than as an advantage of the other.  
The labelling of the £3 difference as a cash discount rather than as a credit card surcharge 
highlights the different reference points, and consumers are less willing to accept a surcharge 
than to forego a discount. 
 
The results show that (in V1) no subjects accepted the surcharge whereas (in V2) three 
subjects decided to forego the discount, so the anticipated results were reported - at a 
significance level of 0.005.  There was a conspicuous preference in V1 and V2 for accepting 
the gain and avoiding the loss respectively. 
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 For Situation C it was anticipated that subjects would strongly favour the ‘Yes’ box in V1 
and the ‘No’ box in V2.  However, the results from V1 and V2 subjects showed a very 
similar distribution and the differences were not statistically significant.  Whichever way this 
dilemma was framed the subjects exhibited a relatively strong degree of risk aversion.  One 
plausible explanation could be that the subjects were generally disinclined to invest in risky 
projects as a result of their strong risk aversion since, in either framing, there is a 70% 
likelihood of the guaranteed return being greater than the cost of borrowing.  Where one 
course of action (i.e. choosing to borrow funds at an initial interest rate of 8% in order to 
invest in a project promising a return of 9% over five years (has an outcome which is 
uncertain, but the alternative course of action (i.e. not borrowing funds) has a certain 
outcome, the subjects in both V1 and V2 prioritised certainty irrespective of framing. 
 
The expectation regarding Situation D was that there would be a preference reversal between 
V1 (favouring the ‘Yes’ option) and V2 (favouring the ‘No’ option).  Whilst the results are 
statistically significant at the 0.005 level, the pattern shows a majority of ‘No’ answers for 
both V1 and V2.  A plausible explanation for this is hard to propose - other than the very 
large proportion of V2 subjects favouring ‘No’ (as anticipated) impacting on the calculation 
of χ2, although both V1 and V2 subjects favour risk aversion.  Nevertheless, the impact of 
framing has clearly made a difference.  Subjects have generally opted for the certain option 
(i.e. do not invest) in both V1 and V2, but some overcame their risk aversion as evidenced by 
the framing effect. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, whilst it is acknowledged that there is an element of artificiality involved when 
subjects are presented with contrived dilemmas requiring them to choose what they consider 
to be the best option, the role of language in the social construction of reality (including our 
experience of specific decision-making dilemmas) is important in the context of framing.  
Forms of wording can be chosen to encourage subjects to perceive decision dilemmas in 
particular ways. 
 
As with the finding of Tversky & Kahneman (1981), evidence has been presented to show (at 
least for Situations B and D) that seemingly inconsequential changes in the framing of 
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dilemmas can generate significant shifts in preferences.  This is due both to framing and to 
the shape of the value function (favouring the avoidance of losses over the securing of gains). 
 
A strong tendency to risk aversion in Situations A and C probably explains the unexpected 
results for these particular dilemmas. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
A PILOT STUDY ON FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
 
 
PLEASE HELP!! 
 
 
Your help would be greatly appreciated in this pilot study relating to the framing of 
financial decisions.  It will only take about five minutes of your time. 
 
Please accept at face value the outlined circumstances in each of the four choice 
situations described in this questionnaire.  Do not query the assumptions underlying 
each situation! 
 
You are invited to choose one preferred option from each of the four pairs of options 
given below.  Do not spend more than a minute or so in making each choice.  It is 
your initial preference which is of particular interest in each case. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers: the thing that matters is your preference in each 
of the four situations A to D.  Please indicate your choices by ticking the appropriate 
box in each of the specified pairs of options. 
 
Your answers will be both anonymous and confidential.  The details provided will be 
aggregated for purposes of analysis in ways which will ensure that no individual's 
identity will be revealed. 
 
Would you kindly respond (via my mail tray) by 23 June? There will be no reminders! 
 
Thank you in anticipation of your help. 
 
 
 
Professor Richard M S Wilson 
 
 
 
 
 
V1 
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SITUATION A 
 
Which of the following two alternatives would you prefer? 
 
Option X: A certain gain of £250. 
 
Option Y: A 25% chance of gaining £1,000 (with a 75% chance of gaining nothing). 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  X        or  Y  
 
 
SITUATION B 
 
You have just filled your car with petrol at a service station.  You go over to the cashier's kiosk to pay 
and are given the following alternatives: 
 
Option E: Paying £30 in cash. 
 
Option F: Being surcharged by 10% if you pay by credit card. 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  E        or  F 
 
 
SITUATION C 
 
Would you borrow funds from a bank at an annual interest rate of 8% to invest in a project which 
promises a guaranteed return of 9% p.a. over five years if there is a 30% chance that the cost of 
borrowing will rise to 10% p.a. at some point over the project's life? 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  Yes           or  No   
 
 
SITUATION D 
 
Imagine that you have a windfall of £1,000 to invest and that you are considering investing in a 
particular company's shares - but only for 12 months. 
 
Your financial advisor offers you the following forecast: 
 
* There is a 40% likelihood that the share price of the company in which you are interested will rise 
over the next year along with a 20% likelihood that it will stay the same. 
 
Would you invest in the company's shares? 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  Yes           or  No   
 
 
 
 
V1 
 
To facilitate analysis please provide the following details. 
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GENDER (tick one box): 
 
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
AGE (please state age at last birthday) 
 
 
 
 
ROLE (tick one box)  
 
Academic staff 
 
 
 
Support staff 
 
 
 
Research student 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP 
 
 
 
 
 
V1 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
A PILOT STUDY ON FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
 
 
PLEASE HELP!! 
 
 
Your help would be greatly appreciated in this pilot study relating to the framing of 
financial decisions. It will only take about five minutes of your time. 
 
Please accept at face value the outlined circumstances in each of the four choice 
situations described in this questionnaire.  Do not query the assumptions underlying 
each situation! 
 
You are invited to choose one preferred option from each of the four pairs of options 
given below.  Do not spend more than a minute or so in making each choice.  It is 
your initial preference which is of particular interest in each case. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers: the thing that matters is your preference in each 
of the four situations A to D.  Please indicate your choices by ticking the appropriate 
box in each of the specified pairs of options. 
 
Your answers will be both anonymous and confidential.  The details provided will be 
aggregated for purposes of analysis in ways which will ensure that no individual's 
identity will be revealed. 
 
Would you kindly respond (via my mail tray) by 23 June? There will be no reminders! 
 
Thank you in anticipation of your help. 
 
 
 
Professor Richard M S Wilson 
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SITUATION A 
 
Which of the following two alternatives would you prefer? 
 
Option X: A certain loss of £250. 
 
Option Y: A 75% chance of losing £1,000 (with a 25% chance of losing nothing). 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  X        or  Y  
 
 
SITUATION B 
 
You have just filled your car with petrol at a service station.  You go over to the cashier's kiosk to pay 
and are given the following alternatives: 
 
Option E: Paying £33 by credit card. 
 
Option F: Receiving a discount of £3 if you pay by cash. 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  E        or  F 
 
 
SITUATION C 
 
Would you borrow funds from a bank at an annual interest rate of 8% to invest in a project which 
promises a guaranteed return of 9% p.a. over five years if there is a 70% likelihood that the cost of 
borrowing will not rise over the life of the project? 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  Yes           or  No   
 
 
SITUATION D 
 
Imagine that you have a windfall of £1,000 to invest and that you are considering investing in a 
particular company's shares - but only for 12 months. 
 
Your financial advisor offers you the following forecast: 
 
* There is a 40% chance that the share price of the company in which you are interested will fall over 
the next year and a 20% chance that it will remain unchanged. 
 
Would you invest in the company's shares? 
 
 Please tick one box to indicate your choice:  Yes           or  No   
 
 
 
V2 
 
 24
 25
To facilitate analysis please provide the following details. 
 
 
GENDER (tick one box): 
 
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
AGE (please state age at last birthday) 
 
 
 
 
ROLE (tick one box)  
 
Academic staff 
 
 
 
Support staff 
 
 
 
Research student 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP 
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